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Iowa’s Original Ethanol Debate:  
The Power Alcohol Movement  
of 1933–1934 
JEFFREY T. MANUEL 
IOWA is perhaps best known to the rest of the nation for two 
things: corn and politics. Iowa’s prestige for the productivity 
of its farms dates from the state’s earliest days. Iowa’s fame for 
politics also has a long history, although many Americans in the 
twenty-first century associate the state’s political influence with 
the Iowa caucuses, which became the first test for presidential 
hopefuls beginning in the 1970s.1 When Iowa’s crucial role in 
choosing presidential candidates was combined with its enor-
mous corn production, ethanol— the name given to ethyl alcohol 
that is often produced from grain (typically corn) and used as a 
liquid transportation fuel—became central to the state’s history.2  
 Iowa has consistently led the nation in ethanol production. In 
2016 Iowa was forecast to produce almost 3.9 billion gallons of 
ethanol for fuel—far and away the most of any state, nearly double 
                                                 
Research for this article was supported by a State Historical Society of Iowa Re-
search Grant. 
1. On the history of the Iowa caucuses, see John C. Skipper, The Iowa Caucuses: 
First Tests of Presidential Aspiration, 1972–2008 (Jefferson, NC, 2010); and Hugh 
Winebrenner and Dennis J. Goldford, The Iowa Precinct Caucuses: The Making of 
a Media Event, 3rd ed. (Iowa City, 2010). Iowans also played crucial roles at the 
federal level, especially in setting agricultural policy, during the decades from 
1890 to 1940. Four Iowans—James Wilson, Edwin Meredith, Henry C. Wallace, 
and Henry A. Wallace—served as U.S. secretary of agriculture during that era. 
2. Ethyl alcohol is produced by the fermentation of sugars by yeasts. It can be 
produced from many sources, although corn has been the predominant feed-
stock for ethanol production in the United States. 
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the production of second-place Nebraska.3 Ethanol became one 
of Iowa’s major industries by the early twenty-first century, gener-
ating 43,000 jobs and approximately 3.5 percent of the state’s gross 
domestic product, according to industry advocates.4 Ethanol has 
received substantial political support over the years, ranging from 
tax breaks in the late 1970s to the 2005 Renewable Fuel Standard’s 
nationwide mandate for ethanol-gasoline blends. 
 Both Congress and presidential administrations supported 
ethanol during this period, largely for political reasons. In the late 
1970s, for instance, President Jimmy Carter launched a nation-
wide ethanol program as part of an effort to woo Iowa voters 
during the 1980 presidential election. The ethanol question domi-
nated Iowa’s presidential contests, leading candidates from both 
parties to support ethanol in the hope of winning the crucial Iowa 
caucuses. One reporter joked during the 2008 primaries that once 
presidential aspirants arrived in Iowa to campaign, “one of their 
first orders of business was bowing to the ethanol gods.”5 In short, 
Iowa has been central to the nation’s great debate over ethanol 
over the past 40 years.  
 Debate over ethanol and biofuels sharply divided Iowans and 
other Americans concerned about energy policies during this era. 
Supporters portrayed ethanol as a miraculous fuel that could pro-
mote energy independence by weaning the nation off of foreign 
oil. Ethanol, supporters claimed, would clean the air while sup-
porting the nation’s farmers. In contrast, ethanol’s detractors por-
trayed the fuel—and government subsidies for it—as a political 
boondoggle. Ethanol did little to help the environment, detractors 
noted, and shifted large sums of taxpayer dollars into the pockets 
of agribusiness corporations and their lobbyists.6 Ethanol debates 
                                                 
3. Chris Buckner, “U.S. Ethanol Plant Capacity Increases for Third Consecutive 
Year,” U. S. Energy Information Administration, 8/10/2016, www.eia.gov. 
4. Iowa Renewable Fuels Association, “Ethanol and the Economy,” http:// 
iowarfa.org/ethanol-center/ethanol-facts/ethanol-and-the-economy/. 
5. Bill Lambrecht, “Political Road Gets Rockier for Ethanol,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 
7/22/2007. 
6. The literature debating ethanol and other biofuels is voluminous and growing. 
For a brief overview, see Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Re-
making of the Modern World, rev. ed. (New York, 2012), 649–70. A supportive but 
slightly dated approach is in Hal Bernton, William Kovarik, and Scott Sklar, The 
Forbidden Fuel: A History of Power Alcohol, new ed. (Lincoln, NE, 2010). 
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crossed party lines, often pitting midwestern and rural politicians 
—both Democrats and Republicans—against representatives of 
metropolitan areas or oil- and gas-producing regions. 
 Yet for all the debate over ethanol in recent decades, there has 
been a surprising amnesia about alcohol fuels in Iowa before the 
1970s energy crises. Both sides of the ethanol debate have forgot-
ten about alcohol fuel’s long history in Iowa and have failed to 
learn from previous efforts to promote alcohol fuels. This is part 
of a larger amnesia about the complex history of energy use and 
alternatives to oil and gas in the United States. As Alexis Madrigal 
notes, “There’s almost no institutional memory of what happened 
before the energy crises of the ’70s.”7 This article describes Iowa’s 
first major debate over ethanol, a movement—known as the power 
alcohol movement—to legislate alcohol-gasoline blends in the 
1930s, a time when power alcohol, like ethanol today, was the 
focus of vigorous debate in Des Moines and Washington, D.C., 
that pitted farmers and their representatives against gasoline 
consumers and oil companies. 
 The 1933–1934 power alcohol debate was a significant mo-
ment in Iowa’s twentieth-century industrial and agricultural his-
tory. Although the state ultimately did not pass a law mandating 
alcohol-gasoline blends, the movement fused farm interests, 
state politicians, and researchers into a powerful interest group. 
That coalition would later prove crucial to the creation of Iowa’s 
agrochemical industrial complex. The power alcohol movement 
also highlights the key role that several Iowans played in setting 
national agricultural and energy policy in the 1930s. Henry A. 
Wallace’s contributions to the New Deal are well known, but his 
initial support for alcohol fuels as a form of farm relief has been 
little discussed by historians. The power alcohol movement was 
Wallace’s final attempt to find new markets for corn before fully 
embracing supply reduction strategies through the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration. Less well known but also important 
was chemical engineer Leo Christensen, an Iowa State College 
professor and tireless booster for power alcohol. Christensen co-
ordinated power alcohol’s diverse advocates in the 1930s. In 1934 
he coauthored an influential book, Power Alcohol and Farm Relief, 
                                                 
7. Alexis Madrigal, Powering the Dream: The History and Promise of Green Technology 
(Cambridge, MA, 2011), 1. 
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that made a case for power alcohol as technically feasible and po-
litically necessary.8 The outlines of Iowa’s later biofuel debates 
originated in the 1933–1934 power alcohol movement. 
 Iowa’s power alcohol movement is also significant within the 
longer history of alcohol fuels in the United States. Historians 
have portrayed the push for power alcohol in the 1930s as an in-
teresting precursor to the serious ethanol policy that was launched 
in the 1970s. Other historians have discussed the demand for fed-
eral power alcohol legislation in those years but have overlooked 
Iowa’s key role in launching the movement to legislate alcohol-
gasoline blends.9 Iowa’s debate was not a curious sideline or an 
isolated local example; it marked an important turning point in 
the history of alcohol fuels in the United States, which stretched 
back into the nineteenth century and continues well into the 
twenty-first. 
 The 1930s movement stands out as the last moment when 
nineteenth-century agrarian rhetoric was central to arguments for 
alcohol fuel from grain. Farmers in the 1930s were keenly aware 
of the energy transition on the farm that was replacing horses with 
cars and tractors. Thus, they framed the argument for alcohol 
fuel in terms of an old agrarian demand that farmers needed pro-
tective legislation to ameliorate the costs of technological change. 
Iowa’s power alcohol debate was also an origin point for legisla-
tion mandating alcohol-gasoline blends. The idea that legislation 
should require that motor fuel contain a certain percentage of al-
cohol gained national attention in the 1930s in the wake of Iowa’s 
debate. The idea circulated among ethanol boosters for decades 
before finally becoming law in the early twenty-first century with 
the Renewable Fuel Standard. Finally, the power alcohol debate 
in Iowa highlights how energy and agricultural policymaking 
has often involved regional or interstate conflict based on re-
source production. After the 1970s energy crises, rhetoric about 
                                                 
8. Leo M. Christensen, Ralph M. Hixon, and Ellis I. Fulmer, Power Alcohol and 
Farm Relief (New York, 1934), 19. 
9. Bernton et al., Forbidden Fuel; August W. Giebelhaus, “Farming for Fuel: The 
Alcohol Motor Fuel Movement of the 1930s,” Agricultural History 54 (1980), 173–84; 
David E. Wright, “Alcohol Wrecks a Marriage: The Farm Chemurgic Movement 
and the USDA in the Alcohol Fuels Campaign in the Spring of 1933,” Agricul-
tural History 67 (1993), 36–66. 
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national energy independence or energy security has tended to 
obscure important regional differences within the United States 
regarding energy policies. Those differences were at the center of 
the 1933–1934 debate, which pitted midwestern farm interests 
against the oil and gas producers based in other regions. Inter-
estingly, many of those interstate conflicts may reappear in the 
twenty-first century as a result of the shale revolution’s dramatic 
increase in U.S. oil production, which has raised difficult questions 
about which regions should benefit from federal energy policy. 
Similar questions were at the heart of the 1930s power alcohol 
debate. 
 
USING ALCOHOL as fuel had a long history prior to the 1930s. 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, Americans used blends 
of alcohol and other liquids—often turpentine—to fuel lamps for 
lighting. Fuels known as “burning fluids,” or camphene, used in 
alcohol lamps, gave off a brighter light than tallow candles and 
were significantly cheaper than whale oil. Unfortunately, they 
were highly explosive.10 With the development of the internal-
combustion engine in the late nineteenth century, alcohol was 
held out as a potential fuel for the new motor. Although alcohol 
fuel was overshadowed by gasoline as the fuel of choice for 
internal-combustion engines, the door never fully closed on al-
ternative fuels in the early decades of the twentieth century. Calls 
to use alcohol as a fuel—either in its pure form or blended with 
gasoline—arose whenever there were concerns that gasoline 
might run out or when surplus crops sent prices down and farm-
ers sought new markets for their harvests.11 During the 1920s, 
several companies attempted to market alcohol fuels or gasoline-
alcohol blends, but the blends were rendered uneconomical by 
cheap gasoline from newly opened wells in the mid-continent oil 
                                                 
10. Christopher Jones, Routes of Power: Energy and Modern America (Cambridge, 
MA, 2014), 93. On the history of camphene and burning fluids, see Harold F. 
Williamson and Arnold R. Daum, The American Petroleum Industry: The Age of Il-
lumination, 1859–1899 (Evanston, IL, 1959), 27–42; and Loris S. Russell, A Heritage 
of Light: Lamps and Lighting in the Early Canadian Home (Toronto, 1968), 93–110. 
11. Bernton et al., Forbidden Fuel, 8; Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, 
Money and Power (New York, 2009), 6-7; Giebelhaus, “Farming for Fuel,” 174; 
Tom McCarthy, Auto Mania: Cars, Consumers, and the Environment (New Haven, 
CT, 2007), 47–48. 
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fields. The discovery that tetraethyl lead could be added to gas-
oline to prevent it from knocking (pre-igniting in the cylinder) 
killed demand for alcohol as an octane booster in the 1920s.12 By 
the early 1930s, alcohol fuels were considered technically feasible 
but economically unpromising. 
 At the same time, the United States was undergoing a trans-
formation as motive power shifted from animals and steam en-
gines to gasoline-powered automobiles, tractors, trucks, and buses. 
As historian Daniel Yergin writes, the years following World 
War I witnessed “the motorization of the American people.”13 
Iowa was hardly exempt from this process. By 1931, Iowa had 
over 700,000 registered passenger cars and consumed over 364 
million gallons of gasoline annually.14 Less noticed but equally 
important was the marked decline in the demand for animals to 
supply power in cities and on farms. During the 1920s, Ameri-
cans destroyed over six million horses and mules.15 
 The shift from animal power to engine power had profound 
effects on American farming. As farm animals gave way to trac-
tors and cars, land that had previously been used for pasture was 
freed up for grain production. During the 1920s, approximately 
21 million acres of farmland shifted from growing feed for 
animals to producing commodities for the market.16 But fewer 
animals on American farms and in American cities meant less 
                                                 
12. Giebelhaus, “Farming for Fuel,” 174–75; Alan L. Olmstead and Paul Rhode, 
“The Farm Energy Crisis of 1920,” Agricultural History 62 (1988), 48–60; McCar-
thy, Auto Mania, 48–49. 
13. Yergin, The Prize, 191; Olmstead and Rhode, “The Farm Energy Crisis of 
1920,” 48–49. For other overviews of the shift toward automobiles and internal 
combustion engines in U.S. history, see Martin V. Melosi, Coping with Abundance: 
Energy and Environment in Industrial America (New York, 1985), 103–12; McCar-
thy, Auto Mania; David E. Nye, Consuming Power: A Social History of American 
Energies (Cambridge, MA, 1998), 175–83; and Christopher W. Wells, Car Country: 
An Environmental History (Seattle, 2012). 
14. “Use of Alcohol from Farm Products in Motor Fuel,” S. Doc. No. 73-57, at 41 
(1933). 
15. Z. R. Pettet, The Farm Horse (Washington, DC, 1933), 7; David M. Kennedy, 
Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945 (New 
York, 1999), 17. See also Ann Norton Greene, Horses at Work: Harnessing Power 
in Industrial America (Cambridge, MA, 2008), 270–73; and Clay McShane and 
Joel A. Tarr, The Horse in the City: Living Machines in the Nineteenth Century (Bal-
timore, 2007). 
16. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 17; Greene, Horses at Work, 273. 
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demand for feed, exacerbating the glut of grain that lowered crop 
prices throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Prices for agricultural 
products dropped throughout the 1920s and then fell precipi-
tously at the beginning of the Great Depression.17 Although the 
farm problem of the 1920s and early 1930s was multifaceted, 
many observers at the time blamed gasoline-powered engines 
for farmers’ woes. For instance, a 1933 photo in the Des Moines 
Register captured this sentiment by showing a farmer driving a 
tractor with the caption, “They displaced horses, but they don’t 
eat the resulting surplus of feed.”18 Farmers, like most Ameri-
cans, eagerly embraced the internal-combustion engine but were 
also keenly aware of how it disrupted the older farm economy. 
 Power alcohol offered the alluring prospect that crops could 
be converted into alcohol fuel and farms could return to the old 
days of growing fuel for the animals—or machines, in this case—
that worked on the farm. As an Iowa newspaper editorial put it, 
“Instead of having our horses eat the corn we can make the tractor 
eat it.”19 Farmers and their allies also framed a pro–power alcohol 
argument in terms of a debt owed by petroleum. As oil and gas 
displaced agricultural products as fuel, farmers contended that 
oil and gas owed something in return to farmers and rural Amer-
ica. As a longtime farmer recalled, “Petroleum products first be-
gan to crowd out agricultural products when the kerosene lamp 
succeeded the tallow candle, and they have been at it ever since. 
. . . Today, when the suggestion is made that petroleum products 
pay back to the farming industry a small part of what it has 
robbed them of . . . a hulabaloo goes up from one end of the country 
to the other, and thousands of dollars are spent in propaganda 
against such a proposition.”20 American farmers in the 1920s and 
                                                 
17. For an overview of the farm situation in the 1920s and 1930s, see R. Douglas 
Hurt, American Agriculture: A Brief History, rev. ed. (West Lafayette, IN, 2002), 
221–330; idem, Problems of Plenty: The American Farmer in the Twentieth Century 
(Chicago, 2002), 41–96; and Theodore Saloutos, The American Farmer and the New 
Deal (Ames, 1982). For the situation in Iowa specifically, see Dorothy Schwieder, 
“Rural Iowa in the 1920s: Conflict and Continuity,” and Joseph Frazier Wall, “The 
Iowa Farmer in Crisis, 1920–1936,” Annals of Iowa 47 (1983), 104–27. Both are re-
printed in Marvin Bergman, ed., Iowa History Reader (Iowa City, 2008), 327–46. 
18. “Federal Opinion on Alcohol-Gas,” Des Moines Register, 5/15/1933. 
19. L. A. Brunsting, “The Quiet Hour,” Sioux Center News, 2/24/1938. 
20. Rolfe Arrow, letter to the editor, Humboldt Independent, 8/15/1933. 
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’30s had witnessed a wholesale transformation of motive power 
on their farms. It was impossible for them to deny the benefits of 
gasoline-powered tractors and cars, but they were keenly aware 
of the costs of the transition in terms of destroyed animals and 
falling crop prices. Alcohol fuels held out the possibility of re-
gaining some of what gasoline had taken away. 
 Another factor motivating support for alcohol fuels in the 1930s 
was concern that gasoline supplies would run out in the near 
future. That worry was as old as the oil industry. Fears of deple-
tion had stalked the petroleum trade since its birth in the mid–
nineteenth century. In the early decades of the twentieth century, 
there were gasoline shortages in some regions, especially as de-
mand for automobile fuel surged ahead of refining capabilities. 
Fears of a so-called gasoline famine were endemic in the 1900s 
and 1910s.21 By the 1920s and early 1930s, however, refining break-
throughs that increased gasoline production and falling demand 
due to the depression alleviated immediate fears of gasoline short-
ages. Nonetheless, many observers fretted about depletion even 
in the midst of low prices during the 1930s. Their fears were 
driven less by rational analysis of markets and supplies than by 
a commonsense notion that oil was a nonrenewable resource that 
must run out at some point. For instance, advocates of power 
alcohol described the nation’s oil and gas as a “national reserve” 
that was constantly being depleted. In contrast, crops were a “na-
tional income of energy” or a renewable resource that could be 
replenished each season.22 
 The technical feasibility of using alcohol as a fuel, the shift 
from animal to motor power, and fears of oil depletion were the 
deep factors driving interest in power alcohol in the 1920s and 
’30s. But it was the collapse of crop prices in the early 1930s that 
spurred serious discussion of mandating alcohol fuels and led to 
Iowa’s proposed power alcohol legislation in the 1930s. Average 
commodity prices dropped 37 percent between 1929 and 1933 
while farmers’ gross income dropped 52 percent.23 In 1933 the 
Iowa Farmers Grain Dealers Association described the farm crisis 
                                                 
21. Yergin, The Prize, 95–96; McCarthy, Auto Mania, 17–18.  
22. Christensen et al., Power Alcohol and Farm Relief, 19. 
23. Hurt, Problems of Plenty, 63. 
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as “the greatest emergency the state has ever seen.”24 It was in 
this context of acute crisis that legislation mandating the use of 
alcohol fuel was first proposed in Iowa. 
 By the early 1930s, then, Iowa farmers were both dependent 
on gasoline-powered machinery and reeling from a long-term 
agricultural depression that had slashed commodity prices. Out 
of this vortex came the power alcohol movement, a popular but 
diffuse campaign to mandate that the nation’s gasoline supply 
be blended with alcohol derived from American-grown crops. 
The proposal was intended primarily as a means of providing 
economic relief to struggling farmers by creating a lucrative new 
market for their harvests.25 
 
LEGISLATION supporting alcohol-gasoline blends cropped up 
in several midwestern states during the 1930s, but Iowa was the 
clear leader of the movement. Iowa’s interest in power alcohol 
began with a study by researchers at Iowa State College (now 
Iowa State University). In late 1932 several professors at Iowa 
State began investigating the feasibility of using a blend of 8 per-
cent ethyl alcohol, 2 percent of a blending agent such as benzene, 
and 90 percent gasoline as a motor fuel. The study brought to-
gether faculty from chemistry, mechanical engineering, chemical 
engineering, and agricultural economics. These researchers were 
convinced that the food market for agricultural production would 
not expand in the near future, so alternative markets were needed 
to avoid ongoing agricultural depression. They also were intrigued 
by evidence that alcohol-gasoline blends were already being used 
successfully in several other countries.26 Early tests found that 
blended fuels containing 10 to 20 percent alcohol had better anti-
knock properties than pure gasoline (that is, it was less likely to 
pre-ignite in the combustion chamber). The researchers’ main 
                                                 
24. “Grain Dealers Ask Aid Action,” Des Moines Register, 1/27/1933. 
25. Giebelhaus, “Farming for Fuel,” 173, 175–76. 
26. Alan I Marcus and Erik Lokensgard, “The Chemical Engineers of Iowa State 
College,” Annals of Iowa 48 (1986), 198; “Study Surplus Control Plan,” Des Moines 
Register, 1/1/1933; “New Motor Fuel Is Tested Here,” Ames Daily Tribune-Times, 
1/3/1933; Wright, “Alcohol Wrecks a Marriage,” 46–47. Wright argues that a 
conference on alcohol fuels at Iowa State on December 10, 1932, marked the 
birth of the 1930s power alcohol movement. 
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emphasis, however, was the fuel’s ability to use up excess corn 
supplies and relieve the farm crisis.27 
 It is not surprising that Iowa’s power alcohol plan was hatched 
at Iowa State College. In the early 1930s Iowa State was a hothouse 
for collaboration between engineering and agricultural sciences. 
Engineering faculty and agricultural researchers worked on par-
allel tracks in most universities at the time, often competing for 
scarce funding during the depression. Yet Iowa State College 
developed a “highly unusual” and very productive collaboration 
between the two fields. Practically, the harmony between engi-
neering and agriculture found an outlet in the work of chemical 
engineers who eagerly promoted a new chemical industry 
based on agricultural products. Throughout the 1920s, chemical 
engineering faculty experimented with various ways to turn agri-
cultural waste into useful products. Experiments included turn-
ing corncobs into chemicals such as acetone, oxalic acid, furfural, 
and even plastics. Iowa State’s chemical engineers were also 
savvy promoters of their research. They recognized that ongoing 
funding and public support for their investigations depended on 
publicizing their work to the state’s major industries and high-
lighting the industrial possibilities of Iowa’s abundant agricul-
tural waste products. Thus, Iowa State College researchers ap-
proached the alcohol fuel issue with the confidence borne of a 
decade of experimenting across disciplinary lines to create indus-
trial products from farm output.28 Building on the researchers’ 
initial findings, Iowa legislators quickly brought the issue to the 
state capital. 
 In the first days of 1933, Iowa politicians took the research 
coming from Ames and pulled it into the orbit of state politics. 
Power alcohol legislation found fertile ground in Iowa’s 45th 
General Assembly. An unprecedented Democratic majority had 
entered office on the coattails of Roosevelt’s landslide election. 
                                                 
27. “State College Scientists Striving to Develop Production Technique for Man-
ufacture of New Motor Fuel to Use Nation’s Surplus Corn,” Ames Daily Tribune-
Times, 1/4/1933. 
28. Marcus and Lokensgard, “The Chemical Engineers of Iowa State College,” 
177–205. David Wright notes that Iowa State College’s researchers were part of 
a loose, nationwide coalition of agricultural scientists working in the 1920s to 
fuse agriculture and chemistry. Wright, “Alcohol Wrecks a Marriage,” 40. 
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Patrick Bauer describes the 1932 election in Iowa as one in which 
“Democratic candidates were elected to positions that had been 
held by an almost unbroken line of Republicans since before the 
Civil War.”29 Reversing decades of Republican dominance of 
Iowa’s General Assembly, Democrats controlled Iowa’s House 
of Representatives with a 77–31 majority; the Iowa Senate was 
evenly split between the parties, with the Democratic lieutenant 
governor breaking tie votes; and Democrat Clyde Herring occu-
pied the governor’s mansion, only the second Democratic gover-
nor in Iowa since the Civil War. That wholesale shift in Iowa’s 
political culture created a context in which new and more radical 
ideas for farm relief, such as power alcohol, received more con-
sideration than they had in earlier eras. Due to the farm crisis, the 
political situation in Iowa in 1932 and 1933 “had reached the 
point where [leaders] were ready to risk a change.”30 
 Iowa State researchers had shown that alcohol-gasoline blends 
were technically feasible, but it remained unclear whether there 
would be a market for them given the low price of oil and cus-
tomers’ familiarity with straight gasoline. As a solution, state law-
makers considered mandating that alcohol derived from Iowa’s 
surplus corn be blended into gasoline. A legal mandate would 
solve alcohol fuel’s economic problems by instantly creating a 
market for the fuel regardless of cost. Iowa state senators Frank 
Byers of Linn County and Fred Nelson of Story County, both Re-
publicans, outlined a proposed bill. They were motivated pri-
marily by the belief that, if passed, such a bill “would absorb the 
corn surplus.” Yet they acknowledged that any legislation would 
be effective only if it could reach beyond Iowa. Eventually, the 
U.S. Congress would need to adopt a similar proposal nation-
wide to make a serious dent in the country’s corn surplus.31 Thus, 
when Iowa’s General Assembly convened on January 9, 1933, the 
alcohol fuel issue was poised to be one of the year’s most conten-
tious legislative matters. 
                                                 
29. Patrick B. Bauer, “Farm Mortgagor Relief Legislation in Iowa during the 
Great Depression,” Annals of Iowa 50 (1989), 28.  
30. C. C. Clifton, “Democrats to Rule Iowa House,” Des Moines Register, 11/10/ 
1933; Earle D. Ross, Iowa Agriculture: An Historical Survey (Iowa City, 1951), 167. 
See also 1933 Iowa House Journal. 
31. “Propose Bill on Motor Fuel,” Oelwein Daily Register, 1/7/1933. 
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 Support for power alcohol legislation came from a coalition 
of farmers, agricultural scientists, and politicians representing 
rural interests. The foremost supporters of power alcohol were 
scientists and engineers at midwestern universities who believed 
that converting agricultural surpluses into fuel could solve the 
farm crisis. These scientists were supported by Corn Belt farmers 
who were always eager to find new markets for their products, 
organizations such as the Farm Bureau that represented farmers’ 
interests in the halls of power, and politicians who sought farm-
ers’ votes. 
 Opposition to the power alcohol plan developed more slowly, 
but once it became clear that possible legislation would mandate 
an alcohol fuel blend, the petroleum industry coordinated a 
powerful counterattack. Nationally, the petroleum industry in 
the early 1930s was organized through the American Petroleum 
Institute (API). Facing low oil prices and rising taxes in 1932, 
including a new federal excise tax on gasoline, the API focused on 
lowering state and local gasoline taxes. Many states had raised 
gasoline taxes, or were considering doing so, to make up for 
budget shortfalls during the Great Depression. The API formed 
a new industries committee meant to “protect the petroleum 
industry from and relieve it of unjust burdens resulting from 
discriminatory taxation or adverse legislation.”32 When the power 
alcohol bill was first considered in Iowa, then, the petroleum 
industry was already keenly concerned about new state taxes and 
regulations on gasoline and well organized to lobby against them. 
 Within Iowa, petroleum business interests were defended by 
the Iowa Petroleum Association (IPA). That organization was 
formed in 1921—it was originally the Iowa Independent Oil Men’s 
Association—and was made up primarily of jobbers. By 1932, the 
IPA was working closely with other state petroleum organiza-
tions and groups representing drivers’ interests to fight against 
new state and local taxes. For instance, at a meeting in February 
1932 a speaker warned IPA members that state gasoline taxes 
                                                 
32. “Gasoline Taxes Must Come Down” (editorial), Oil and Gas Journal, 6/9/1932, 
32; “National Petroleum Association Convention Asks Government Economies 
and Tax Relief,” Oil and Gas Journal, 9/22/1932, 11; Andrew M. Rowley, “A.P.I. 
Convention Had Many Interesting Phases with Tense Period of Political Ma-
neuvering,” Oil and Gas Journal, 11/24/1932, 31. 
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were “the fastest growing tax in history” and opened the door to 
an “orgy of fraud” by gasoline bootleggers.33 Also opposed to the 
power alcohol plan were the nation’s automobile clubs, such as 
the American Automobile Association, which saw themselves as 
defenders of gasoline consumers.34 
 As word spread that a law requiring alcohol fuel to be blended 
into Iowa’s gasoline supply was brewing in the General Assembly, 
newspapers around the state began reporting on the issue. Many 
of the state’s editorial pages strongly supported the proposal. 
The Ames Daily Tribune-Times called it “most interesting and per-
haps most fruitful of real benefit for Iowa.” The Sumner Gazette 
noted that “nothing which has been announced for some time 
has appealed so much to the popular imagination, according to 
conversation heard in the past two weeks.” News of the benefits 
of alcohol-gasoline blends spread statewide in mid-January when 
the Des Moines Register’s farm editor explained how his own car 
benefited from the fuel. He described better acceleration from the 
blended fuel and encouraged its use across the state, writing, 
“Use of this blend the last few days in my own car has impressed 
me with its merit.”35 
 Some intrepid Iowans took matters into their own hands and 
started mixing regular radiator alcohol into their gasoline after 
reading about the technical success of alcohol-gasoline blends. 
Iowa State faculty rushed to remind people that radiator alcohol 
contained too much water and should not be blended with gas-
oline outside of a laboratory for fear of harming automobile 
engines.36 
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 Bills supporting Iowa’s power alcohol movement were quickly 
drafted and brought before the General Assembly. The legisla-
tion required two stages: first, the state needed to pass laws per-
mitting the manufacture of industrial alcohol (alcohol unsuitable 
for human consumption), which had been banned during Prohi-
bition. Second, legislators needed to tackle the specific mecha-
nism by which alcohol fuel would be mandated. Dealing with 
the first problem was straightforward. In late January the Iowa 
House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed a bill that al-
lowed for the manufacture of industrial alcohol. Observers noted 
the irony that the president of the state’s Woman’s Christian 
Temperance Union had offered the traditional prayer before the 
legislative session opened. On February 3, the Iowa Senate easily 
passed the bill, and Governor Herring signed it into law the fol-
lowing week.37 
 The second phase of legislation, determining exactly how an 
alcohol fuel mandate would work, proved far more difficult. 
While the General Assembly was in session, several powerful 
voices in Iowa politics weighed in with their support for an alco-
hol fuel mandate. First was the formidable Farm Bureau, which 
endorsed alcohol fuels in late January. The Farm Bureau’s annual 
platform called for the production of new products, including 
alcohol fuels, from Iowa’s agricultural crops.38 Next to weigh in 
was Henry A. Wallace, who was among the nation’s most influ-
ential voices on agricultural matters. His father had been U.S. Sec-
retary of Agriculture in the Harding and Coolidge administra-
tions, and he held the same position in the incoming Roosevelt 
administration. In addition, the Wallace family’s farm journal, 
Wallaces’ Farmer, was an influential voice in the agricultural com-
munity in Iowa and the larger Midwest. Speaking to the Iowa 
General Assembly on January 31, Wallace advocated power 
alcohol derived from corn as one important tool for getting the 
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nation’s farmers out of the deep financial furrow of the Great 
Depression.39 
 Wallace had been investigating the power alcohol plan for 
several months and had met with Iowa State researchers. In 
August of the previous year, he had written a column in Wallaces’ 
Farmer claiming, “The chances are ten to one that the automobiles 
of our children and grandchildren will be run to a considerable 
extent with alcohol made from corn.” Converting corn into alco-
hol fuel would be a boon to Iowa, Wallace argued. “We should 
not send all of our automobile money out of the state. If we can 
grow one-fourth of our motor fuel at home, let’s get ready to do 
it.”40 
 In December 1932 Wallace included the power alcohol plan 
as part of the domestic allotment farm relief plan being crafted in 
Congress. Mandating alcohol-gasoline blends was proposed as a 
useful way to help corn farmers in Iowa and Illinois who sold 
corn to the market rather than feeding it to hogs. Mandating that 
some portion of the corn crop be converted into alcohol fuel 
would lessen the depths of the cuts to hog production. Wallace 
acknowledged that the power alcohol plan might harm oil-
producing states in the name of farm relief: “The oil producers 
of the southwest would undoubtedly be temporarily somewhat 
damaged, but the benefit done to the corn farmers would be 
much greater than the damage done to the oil producers.”41 Ini-
tially, Wallace framed the 1933–1934 power alcohol debate as an 
issue of interstate competition rather than national energy policy. 
 Momentum seemed to be on the side of alcohol fuel. The key 
bill mandating that alcohol be mixed into Iowa’s gasoline supply 
was introduced in the Iowa Senate on February 9. The compli-
cated bill would have required that all gasoline sold in Iowa be 
blended with alcohol produced from Iowa crops at a percentage 
set by a new executive council that would monitor annual har-
vests to determine how much of a surplus existed. A state alcohol 
administrator would be charged with permitting new distilleries 
and ensuring that they did not make more than 10 percent profit. 
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As proposed, the bill was technocratic and punitive. It would 
have instantly transformed the state’s gasoline supply and en-
dowed the new alcohol administrator and executive council with 
sweeping power to control the state’s agricultural and energy 
industries.42 
 Criticism of the proposed law appeared immediately in some 
Iowa newspapers. The Mason City Globe-Gazette, for instance, 
worried that the plan would raise gasoline costs for consumers 
and might harm engines.43 In the national press, Business Week 
weighed in with sharp criticism, describing Iowa’s entire power 
alcohol plan as “among the more scatterbrained proposals put 
forward in the general anxiety over the plight of the farmer.” The 
article’s author argued that diluting gasoline with alcohol made 
no financial sense. “What this scheme comes down to is the dilu-
tion of gasoline, selling for 5¢ at the refineries, with an inferior 
liquid fuel costing five times as much per gallon.”44 Opponents of 
the alcohol gasoline mandate spoke on behalf of the petroleum 
industry and, more broadly, Iowa’s gasoline consumers who were 
more worried about the price they paid at the pump than about 
supporting farmers. 
 In February supporters of power alcohol ramped up their 
lobbying on behalf of the bill. Researchers at Iowa State College, 
who had initiated alcohol fuel research months earlier, moved 
quickly to form a committee to promote the plan statewide. 
Ames was to be the center of “a statewide educational cam-
paign” on behalf of the power alcohol bill. Supporters of the bill 
from northwestern Iowa organized a caravan to Des Moines to 
demonstrate the bill’s widespread support in rural Iowa. Propo-
nents of power alcohol legislation also pointed to foreign nations, 
such as Germany, Hungary, and Brazil, that had already enacted 
similar laws. Opponents argued that the situation in those for-
eign nations did not apply to the United States since it was an oil 
exporter and such laws were meant to promote national energy 
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self-sufficiency. Foes of alcohol fuel argued that in the United 
States, unlike in those nations that mandated alcohol fuels, “there 
is a great plenty of oil, and there are both an important petroleum 
industry and a great body of motorists to protest.”45 
 In mid-February, Iowa’s petroleum industry launched a co-
ordinated critique of the power alcohol bill pending in the Gen-
eral Assembly. In a letter of opposition, the IPA outlined numer-
ous criticisms of the bill. (1) It would raise gasoline prices since 
alcohol was more expensive to produce than gasoline. (2) Higher 
gasoline prices would lead many consumers, especially Iowans 
living near a state border, to buy gasoline outside Iowa. (3) Boot-
leggers could bring out-of-state gasoline into Iowa and undersell 
filling stations. (4) As higher prices caused people to cut back on 
driving, the total amount of gasoline taxes collected would de-
crease. (5) High-priced gasoline would lead automotive tourists to 
avoid Iowa, which, in turn, would lead to lower tourism spending. 
(6) New storage facilities would be needed to keep water out of 
gasoline (water caused alcohol and gasoline to separate), and the 
blended fuel would ruin the shellac on carburetor floats. (7) The 
legislative mandate  would use up only 3 percent of the corn crop, 
so it would not actually help Iowa’s farmers much.46  
 Iowa’s power alcohol plan was also criticized by the national 
petroleum industry. The Oil and Gas Journal, the main petroleum 
industry trade publication, reported on Iowa’s power alcohol bill 
throughout early 1933. Early articles focused on technical prob-
lems with alcohol-gasoline blends and emphasized that previous 
efforts to promote alcohol fuels had failed.47 Once it became clear 
that the Iowa legislature was seriously considering the power 
alcohol bill, however, the Oil and Gas Journal took a more critical 
stance. “The petroleum industry needs be concerned,” the journal 
wrote in March 1933, describing Iowa’s legislature as barreling 
ahead with a plan to help farmers despite the costs to the petro- 
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leum industry and drivers. Reflecting the petroleum industry’s 
national perspective, the Oil and Gas Journal argued that a state-
by-state approach to power alcohol would not be helpful. Man-
dating alcohol fuels might make sense in Iowa, but it could un-
leash a wave of beggar-thy-neighbor state legislation. “The ques-
tion then resolves itself into whether each . . . state is to set itself 
apart from the rest of the country and try to live more and more 
within itself. . . . If practiced to place certain states at a disad-
vantage, it is possible retaliatory measures will be taken by those 
states. Maybe Oklahoma will require that every pound of hog 
lard contain 10 per cent hydrogenated cotton seed oil, or Nevada 
might say that every package of corn flakes must contain 10 per 
cent toasted cactus flakes.” Overall, the Oil and Gas Journal argued, 
Iowa’s power alcohol bill “will mean investing additional capital 
to produce an inferior motor fuel from a raw material, the price 
of which is too high even now to compete with petroleum.”48 
 Some local newspapers were sympathetic to the petroleum 
industry’s critiques of power alcohol. The Oelwein Daily Register, 
for instance, wrote, “There is no reason why the auto drivers 
should be penalized for a surplus of corn in the state.”49 Or, as 
the manager of the Iowa Motor Club summed up its opposition, 
“It is a plan to tax motorists one or two additional cents a gallon 
and give this tax to the farmers.”50 
 As Iowans learned about the bill and its potential effects, it 
was clear that it pitted the economic interests of farmers against 
those of gasoline consumers. Thus, when the bill was first de-
bated in Iowa’s General Assembly on February 21, 1933, each 
side of the power alcohol debate made an impassioned case for 
or against the bill. Opponents argued that alcohol from grain was 
expensive to produce and would lead to a rash of engine prob-
lems, such as clogged carburetors and fuel lines. Supporters 
presented evidence from Iowa State College tests showing that 
cars running the gasoline-alcohol blend got better mileage and 
performance. They also emphasized how the fuel would help to 
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alleviate the enormous corn surplus that held down commodity 
prices.51 
 Legislative debate focused on technical questions such as the 
fuel’s performance in automobile engines and potential effects 
on the corn surplus. For instance, the bill’s opponents noted that, 
because even a nationwide plan to blend 2 percent alcohol into 
the gasoline supply was expected to raise the price of gasoline by 
approximately ½ cent, it would be simpler to add a small gasoline 
tax and use the money to purchase corn and then destroy it.52  
 Some observers felt that the General Assembly’s technical de-
bate had drained the life out of an idea that initially resonated with 
a simple agrarian message. The Algona Upper Des Moines newspa-
per wrote, “It seems that somebody or something is always taking 
the joy out of life when what Iowa needs worse than anything else 
is higher prices for hogs and corn.” The Bode Bugle also described 
the bill’s appeal in simple language: “The farmers want these 
measures passed. The business people of Iowa favor the idea. It 
is the one way in which Iowa can do something for herself.”53 
 Because of the “heated debate,” the House of Representatives 
did not move on the alcohol fuel bill in the first session; it was 
pushed back to the second session.54 During the recess from Feb-
ruary 24 to March 6, opponents of the power alcohol bill mar-
shaled their forces and launched a publicity drive urging Iowa leg-
islators to vote no. Rhetoric from the bill’s supporters also sharp-
ened over the recess. One farm woman wrote to the Des Moines 
Register to express her belief that it was time for Iowans to look out 
for their own economic interests. She described the debate as a 
fight between regional interests, pitting Iowa and the Farm Belt 
against “the eastern states where the big factories are located” and 
“the southern states where these big oil men live in luxury.”55 
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Clearly, power alcohol struck an old, agrarian chord among Io-
wans who saw the debate as one pitting the righteous farmers of 
the Midwest against the parasitic oil men of the East and South. 
 As word of Iowa’s power alcohol debate spread, however, it 
became clear that not all farmers supported it. That was espe-
cially true when farmers outside Iowa weighed in on the issue. 
The president of the National Farmers Union, a farmer from Ok-
lahoma, pointed out that many farmers in oil-producing states 
received royalties for oil wells on their land and opposed any-
thing that would lessen the value of that oil. For such farmers, 
the union’s president argued, “crude oil . . . is a farm crop just as 
much as cotton or wheat.”56 
 When the General Assembly returned from its spring recess 
on March 6, the power alcohol bill was the first item on the 
House’s calendar.57 When the bill came up for a vote on March 8, 
it was defeated by a vote of 48–57. The deciding arguments 
against the bill were that it was too vague about where grain al-
cohol would be produced and blended, whether it would come 
from Iowa crops, and whether such a law would constitute an 
unfair tax on Iowans. Other legislators favored the idea but be-
lieved it would work only if implemented on a nationwide basis 
and therefore voted against the Iowa bill.58 Although power 
alcohol had many vocal supporters in Iowa, they were unable to 
alleviate concerns about the effect of requiring a significant 
change in the state’s fuel supply. 
 Many supporters blamed the shadowy machinations of the 
oil industry for the bill’s failure. According to the Rock Valley Bee, 
“The big oil industries got into the game and worked against the 
measure to the end that it was defeated.”59 There was some truth 
to the accusation that the oil industry had worked to defeat the 
Iowa bill and similar ones developed in other states. The American 
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Petroleum Institute coordinated opposition to the bill by or-
ganizing the oil and gas industry as well as other groups repre-
senting motorists, such as state auto clubs, to forge a powerful 
counterpunch to the proposed alcohol fuel mandates.60 
 Opposition to the power alcohol proposals included creative 
marketing schemes funded by the API. Gas station attendants 
received mimeographed paperwork to share with drivers dis-
cussing the perils of alcohol fuel. Filling stations also received 
small sample kits with gasoline and alcohol meant to show how 
the two liquids would separate with the presence of water.61 
 Gasoline consumers—a group that by the mid-1930s included 
most Iowans—were torn. Given concerns about higher gasoline 
prices and technical problems associated with alcohol fuels, many 
motorists likely needed little encouragement from the API to 
oppose power alcohol. Yet Americans were also deeply suspicious 
of the oil industry in the wake of the 1920s Teapot Dome scandal 
and earlier revelations about Standard Oil’s monopoly practices.62 
 Behind the scenes, the API and individual oil companies de-
bated how to respond to the power alcohol mandate. There was 
consensus that the large oil companies would not tolerate pro-
posals such as Iowa’s that required a 10 percent blend of alcohol 
into the gasoline supply, but many companies were open to pro-
posals to blend 1 or 2 percent alcohol if it would alleviate political 
pressure. Although the prospect of losing a percentage of the 
national gasoline supply was hardly welcomed, oil companies 
were well aware that rural gasoline consumption had dropped 
precipitously during the depression. The loss of sales to alcohol 
blends might be made up in increased purchasing power among 
farmers and rural motorists. Standard Oil of New Jersey, for in-
stance, simultaneously lobbied against any national alcohol fuel 
laws and explored how it could profit if the law was passed.63 
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FOLLOWING the power alcohol bill’s failure in early March, 
Iowans who supported a mandate for power alcohol turned their 
attention to Washington, D.C. They hoped a nationwide bill sim-
ilar to the one rejected in Iowa would solve the farm problem. In 
part, supporters realized that Iowa alone was too small of a gas-
oline market to make a dent in the nation’s agricultural glut. A 
report by Iowa State College economists in late March confirmed 
that the state’s plan for mandating alcohol fuel would have had 
no significant effect on the price of corn. Only a nationwide pro-
gram would consume enough surplus to significantly raise the 
price of corn.64 
 Confirming that Iowa politicians hoped to shift the power 
alcohol issue to the federal government, on March 22 the Iowa 
General Assembly passed a resolution encouraging the federal 
government to “enact legislation tending to promote and de-
velop the production of grain or ethyl alcohol to be used as a 
blend with petroleum products as a motor fuel.” The General As-
sembly also asked Congress to add an import duty on blackstrap 
molasses—the primary feedstock for industrial alcohol produc-
tion—to make it equal to the price of corn.65 Newspapers echoed 
the General Assembly’s support for a nationwide alcohol fuel 
plan. According to one editorial, “It might be hard for one state 
alone to make a success of the venture, but if the mixture could 
be used nationally, there is no question but that it would use up 
the surplus of farm products.”66 
 It was not surprising that Iowa politicians turned to the fed-
eral government to solve the power alcohol debate. During the 
spring of 1933, the eyes of Iowans—and most Americans—were 
transfixed on Washington, where the Roosevelt administration 
was preparing to take power. Roosevelt had promised swift, de-
cisive action upon taking the oath of office, and many Iowans that 
spring pondered whether a nationwide alcohol fuel bill might be 
in the cards of the New Deal. 
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 Other states had followed Iowa’s lead in pushing for alcohol 
fuel bills in early 1933.67 On Iowa’s eastern border, a chemist 
from El Paso, Illinois, named Paul Beshers began promoting a na-
tionwide plan to require alcohol be mixed into the nation’s gaso-
line supply. He modestly called it the Beshers Plan.68 It electrified 
farmers in central Illinois and quickly drew condemnation from 
the eastern business press. Business Week mocked Beshers as the 
“current patron saint of this old scheme in modern dress.” Yet 
Beshers’s ambitious plan differed from the one proposed just 
weeks earlier in Iowa by calling for nationwide legislation rather 
than a state law. Beshers and his supporters immediately cap-
tured the attention of Illinois representatives and senators who 
brought forth bills in Congress.69 Yet state officials in Illinois 
nonetheless looked to Iowa to take the lead on alcohol fuel legis-
lation. In a letter, the director of Illinois’s Department of Agricul-
ture wrote, “After we see what Iowa does, we will be in a better 
position to work out a plan for Illinois.”70 
 Other streams of support for alcohol fuel rose up across the 
Midwest, but the key figure channeling their flow into Washing-
ton was an Iowan: Henry A. Wallace. Likely the state’s best-
known farmer and editor, Wallace had Roosevelt’s ear on agri-
cultural matters even before his appointment in late February as 
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, the position his father had held un-
der Presidents Harding and Coolidge. Wallace had learned of the 
power alcohol experiments at Iowa State College months earlier, 
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and he encouraged President Roosevelt to give the idea serious 
consideration as part of his emerging agricultural agenda.71 As 
legislation wound its way through congressional committees, 
Wallace carefully studied alcohol fuel as a potential solution for 
the farm crisis. Wallace even tried using ten gallons of the fuel in 
his official federal vehicle.72 
 National debate over the alcohol fuel legislation came to a 
head in May. Various bills had been introduced in Congress’s 
first session, but none had made it out of committee. In May Wal-
lace went before the Senate Finance Committee to support a bill 
that appeared more promising. It would increase the federal gas-
oline tax by one cent per gallon through 1934. The tax would be 
raised to three cents per gallon after that. If gasoline was mixed 
with alcohol—in a percentage rising from 1 to 5 percent after 
1934—it could avoid the federal gasoline tax altogether.73 
 As it had in Iowa, the API strongly criticized the bill, even 
though it required half as much alcohol as Iowa’s proposed bill. 
An API spokesman suggested that it would be cheaper and more 
efficient for every driver to buy five bushels of corn and burn 
them. The API charged, “The blend legislation . . . was placed on 
the congressional doorstep after failing of enactment in the legis-
latures of Iowa, Minnesota, and South Dakota.” Iowa representa-
tive Otha Wearin countered that Iowa’s General Assembly had 
petitioned Congress to support a nationwide law even though it 
had rejected it at the state level.74 The Senate Finance Committee 
tabled the bill two days later, arguing that it raised questions 
about whether such a bill could combine new taxes with an alco-
hol fuel mandate.75 
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 Alcohol fuel’s supporters were heartened by a U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA) report in mid-May showing that 
power alcohol was technically feasible and would benefit Amer-
ica’s farmers.76 Iowa’s congressional delegation met with Wal-
lace on May 17 to again argue for the importance of a power 
alcohol bill in Congress. Secretary Wallace remained supportive 
but noncommittal.77 
 The May debate in Washington, D.C., proved to be the high-
water mark for alcohol fuel legislation in the 1930s. While Wal-
lace was reassuring Iowa’s congressional delegation that he still 
supported a power alcohol bill, the New Deal’s agricultural pro-
gram was gathering speed and moving in a very different direc-
tion. Laws mandating alcohol fuel blends were predicated on the 
principle of expanding markets for corn as a means of farm relief. 
Wallace and President Roosevelt had concluded, on the other 
hand, that cutting supplies was a more realistic and immediate 
answer to the farm crisis. To that end, the landmark Agricultural 
Adjustment Act was passed on May 12, 1933. Working through 
the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), the USDA 
worked with farmers to reduce the output of major agricultural 
crops, including corn. Although Wallace and the AAA focused 
immediately on cotton since it was the primary product of the 
beleaguered South, by the summer of 1933 the AAA’s attention 
was turning to corn farmers.78 
 When Wallace returned to Des Moines in June, he outlined the 
New Deal’s farm relief efforts thus far. While most of Wallace’s 
focus was on cutting production to raise prices, he indicated that 
he was still considering the power alcohol plan. “We must either 
cut down production or find new markets at home or abroad. 
I think the use of alcohol made from corn in a motor fuel blend 
might offer one outlet for some of our surplus grain so that we 
could produce a normal corn crop again without upsetting the 
balance and causing low prices,” Wallace told an Iowa audience.79 
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Yet the government’s emphasis had shifted to prioritize cutting 
production over mandating new markets. Just as work horses and 
mules had been replaced by petroleum-powered tractors, national 
alcohol fuel legislation was soon left behind by the AAA’s sweep-
ing program to reduce farm output. 
 
WHILE CONGRESS was considering a nationwide alcohol fuel 
bill, debate over power alcohol continued in Iowa even after the 
General Assembly voted down the bill in early March. Only a 
few days after the alcohol fuel bill was defeated in Des Moines, 
the Spencer Chamber of Commerce sponsored an event to sell 500 
gallons of alcohol-blend gasoline in the hope of convincing drivers 
that stories about technical problems with the fuel were untrue.80 
Faculty from Iowa State College and local chambers of commerce 
came together in April to stage a demonstration of the fuel for 
the General Assembly in Des Moines, as well as local demonstra-
tions in Storm Lake, Fort Dodge, and Garner. Another plan sur-
faced to encourage use of alcohol-blend fuels in all state-owned 
vehicles and, ultimately, to reintroduce the failed mandate bill 
in a later legislative session.81 Power alcohol’s backers in Iowa 
clearly had not given up hope that their fuel would be supported 
by consumers and legislation. 
 The largest of the demonstrations came in May, when filling 
stations in Ames sponsored a three-day sale of 22,000 gallons of 
alcohol-blend fuel. The sale was heavily advertised in local news-
papers, and the participating filling stations reported high de-
mand. Drivers who filled their tanks during the sale also reported 
satisfactory results from the new fuel. It was later revealed, how-
ever, that much of the so-called corn alcohol produced for these 
demonstrations was not made from Iowa corn but was distilled 
instead from blackstrap molasses brought in from Cuba and Lou-
isiana. The few midwestern distilleries capable of producing 
anhydrous alcohol were unwilling to invest in new equipment 
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without a law ensuring a steady market for the product, so sup-
plies had to be imported from elsewhere. Legislators, stung by 
the molasses debacle, soon introduced a bill levying a tax of 25 
cents per gallon on alcohol produced from blackstrap molasses.82  
 Legislators tried for another alcohol fuel bill in mid-April. 
That bill would have taxed regular gasoline at five cents per gal-
lon and alcohol-gasoline blends at three cents per gallon, putting 
the two fuels at parity for consumers. The bill was blocked in a 
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parliamentary move on the grounds that it was too similar to the 
failed bill from March.83 
 During the warm summer of 1933, arguments went back and 
forth over alcohol fuel’s performance in automobiles. Iowa State 
researchers found that the fuel performed well in real-world tests, 
leading to minor improvements in acceleration and fuel economy. 
But a major test sponsored by the American Automobile Associ-
ation found that alcohol-blend fuels decreased mileage. Sup-
porters of alcohol fuel charged that the American Automobile 
Association test was faulty, citing faulty equipment and the hot, 
humid conditions of the Virginia test. Congress even considered 
getting into the testing business that summer, with Illinois con-
gressman Everett Dirksen proposing a long-distance road test of 
the fuel in cars driving from Washington, D.C., to the Midwest 
and back. The long-distance road test was delayed several times 
before it was ultimately canceled.84 
 Alcohol fuel supporters in Iowa launched an increasingly bit-
ter critique of the “oil interests” based outside the region. The 
Humboldt Independent wrote, “Propaganda from the east is now 
flooding the mails against the alcohol-gasoline fuel for motor ve-
hicles. It is a determined effort on the part of the large refineries 
to stop the western move for the ‘alky-gas’ mixture.”85 
 Whether alcohol fuel supporters knew it or not, the political 
campaign to mandate the fuel in Iowa and nationwide had al-
ready passed its zenith. By the fall of 1933, the Roosevelt admin-
istration had abandoned its support for power alcohol and in-
stead favored immediate crop reductions for farm relief. That fall 
the AAA launched its hog reduction program by purchasing and 
then destroying six million hogs. Since hogs were major consum-
ers of corn, slaughtering so many hogs exacerbated the corn glut. 
So the AAA began a program to immediately reduce the corn crop 
as well by contracting with farmers to cut production.86 
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 The AAA remained supportive of power alcohol but now re-
ported that “there are practical obstacles to immediate utilization 
of . . . corn in making alcohol for motor fuel. Federal legislation 
to this end has been asked, but it may be at least two years before 
the present domestic manufacturing capacity can be expanded 
sufficiently to handle more than 100 million bushels of corn a 
year.”87 Developing an alcohol fuel industry to soak up excess 
supply thus moved to the background.  
 At about the same time, distilleries began ramping up pro-
duction to meet the demand created by the repeal of Prohibition. 
Repealing the Eighteenth Amendment, one newspaper noted, 
“has assured Iowa of a new market for 50,000,000 to 60,000,000 
bushels of corn.” The National Recovery Administration distillers 
code drafted by Secretary Wallace required whisky to be made 
from corn, which was viewed as Wallace’s effort to protect Iowa’s 
agricultural interests.88 
 With the AAA focused on cutting back corn production and 
the opening of a lucrative new market thanks to the repeal of Pro-
hibition, alcohol fuel’s political momentum quickly fizzled out. 
When the Iowa General Assembly held a special session from 
November 1933 to March 1934, it took no action on power alco-
hol. The news was the same from Washington, D.C. When Iowa 
representative Guy Gillette wrote to his constituents about news 
from the capital in 1934, he noted, “The corn-alcohol fuel blend, 
which still has many warm supporters, does not seem to have 
gained any ground and many of its former supporters have be-
come lukewarm.”89 National efforts for power alcohol legislation 
foundered in 1934. In October, leaders of the power alcohol 
movement announced that they would not seek a bill in the up-
coming congressional session because of a smaller than expected 
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corn crop that fall and staunch opposition from powerful groups 
like the American Automobile Association.90 By early 1935, 
Secretary Wallace was actively downplaying power alcohol as a 
farm relief measure. “We contemplate no action further than that 
we have taken in the last two years,” Wallace said. Alcohol fuel 
was still held out as a long-term possibility but it was no longer 
considered a tool for immediate farm relief since the AAA’s crop 
reductions had already alleviated the worst problems facing corn 
farmers.91 
 
EVEN AS the political push for power alcohol faded in Des 
Moines and Washington, another Iowan took up the cause and 
moved forward with a plan to produce alcohol-blend fuels in the 
Midwest. Leo Christensen was one of the young chemical engi-
neering faculty at Iowa State College who had worked on the 
initial alcohol fuel experiments in 1932. He soon emerged as one 
of Iowa’s leading promoters of power alcohol. One newspaper 
noted how his “honest Danish features glow as he tells the pos-
sibilities of the alky blend.”92 
 In the summer of 1933 Christensen was among the scientists 
who observed the American Automobile Association tests that 
showed lower fuel economy with gasoline-alcohol blends, di-
rectly contradicting his own previous experiments. Christensen 
criticized the tests, arguing that the results were invalid because 
the test was conducted on an especially hot day with highly vol-
atile gasoline. The real-world tests conducted in Ames, he ar-
gued, were a much more accurate demonstration of the fuel’s 
performance.93 
 Traveling to Washington, D.C., Christensen became one of 
the chief supporters of a nationwide alcohol fuel bill. He later 
worked with the USDA to collect accurate statistics about power 
alcohol. He presented his findings to the Senate but could not 
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convince a Senate subcommittee to bring a national power al-
cohol bill forward for a vote. Christensen was “somewhat dis-
appointed” but vowed to continue lobbying for national power 
alcohol.94 
 Frustrated by the lack of political action on power alcohol, 
Christensen and two fellow Iowa State scientists, Ralph Hixon 
and Ellis Fulmer, wrote a book manuscript explaining the tech-
nical and economic benefits of alcohol fuels. They had difficulty 
finding a publisher for the treatise. Eventually they took it to 
William Hale at Dow Chemical, who arranged for it to be pub-
lished by the Chemical Foundation, the entity created during 
World War I to hold the patents for chemicals taken from Ger-
man firms.95 The book, titled Power Alcohol and Farm Relief, was 
published in 1934. 
 In the book, Christensen and his coauthors revealed the pri-
mary motivations driving power alcohol’s supporters in the 1930s. 
First, they were propelled by nationalism. Worried that relying 
on imported agricultural products weakened the United States 
in times of war and hurt the American farmer, they made replac-
ing imported products with alternatives derived from American 
farms central to their research agenda. They also worried that the 
long agricultural depression of the 1920s and early 1930s was 
causing American farmers to sink into European-style peasantry, 
fatally undermining democracy. Second, Christensen and his co- 
authors advocated an early version of resource nationalism and 
energy independence, contrasting fossil fuels such as coal and 
petroleum, which were a “national reserve” that was depleted, 
with the “national income of energy” from photosynthesis. They 
wrote, “Agriculture stores up energy each year from the rays of 
the sun; in contrast, all energy secured from coal and petroleum 
represents a destruction of natural resources which can never be 
replaced. It is sound national economic policy to utilize this an-
nual income of energy and to conserve the reserve supplies of 
coal and petroleum.”96 Like other alcohol fuel proponents in the 
1930s, Christensen proceeded from the assumption that American 
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supplies of petroleum were an exhaustible resource that would 
run out in the near future, although he stopped short of predict-
ing when, exactly, oil supplies would run dry.97 
 Most of Christensen’s book concerned technical analysis of al-
cohol fuel’s performance in engines and its economic challenges. 
Christensen argued that the engineering changes that would be 
required in engines to use pure alcohol as fuel made that option 
unfeasible at the time. He advocated blends containing 10–20 
percent alcohol as an acceptable compromise.98 
 Christensen’s political recommendations were relatively 
conservative, although he did insist that government action was 
needed to spur the alcohol-fuel industry. He opposed laws man-
dating specific amounts of alcohol in the gasoline supply. In-
stead, he recommended altering the federal gasoline tax to make 
alcohol blends competitively priced with straight gasoline and 
then letting consumers decide. Yet the need for farm relief com-
pelled immediate action, in his opinion. He suggested that alco-
hol fuels receive a government subsidy to begin but that such aid 
should be “eliminated at some future date.”99 These political rec-
ommendations never took hold in Des Moines or Washington. 
 In the absence of political action, Christensen joined William 
Hale of Dow Chemical and Francis Garvin of the Chemical Foun-
dation as leading advocates of a nationwide movement to use 
agricultural products, including alcohol fuels, as the basis for a 
chemical industry. Known as the farm chemurgy movement, this 
little-remembered fusion of chemical engineering and agricultural 
sciences was prominent in the 1930s. The chemurgists embraced 
a “vision of a worldwide, agrichemical revolution from which 
alcohol would emerge as a renewable, alternative fuel.” Farm 
chemurgy attracted attention from wealthy industrialists such as 
Henry Ford, who hosted several conferences on the topic.100 
 Although efforts to mandate alcohol fuels via legislation 
foundered after 1934, Christensen continued his quest to create 
an alcohol fuel industry by partnering with the Chemical Foun- 
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dation in a business venture. Christensen resigned his position at 
Iowa State in 1936 to move to Atchison, Kansas, where the Chem-
ical Foundation was building a distillery to produce alcohol for 
fuel. Christensen personally oversaw construction of the distillery, 
worked to perfect the distilling process there, and even coordi-
nated a marketing campaign for the fuel, which was marketed 
throughout the Midwest as Agrol. The Agrol venture had some 
success in the late 1930s. At its zenith, Agrol was offered at two 
thousand filling stations across the Midwest.101 
 When the Agrol blend arrived in Iowa filling stations in 
1937–1938, there was considerable debate in the press over the 
fuel’s benefits and drawbacks. A March 1938 advertisement for 
the fuel urged Iowans to use it to support the farm economy: 
“[Whether or not] you will buy and use an alcohol blend of gas-
oline is not for us to attempt to dictate but you must admit it is 
a step in the right direction. After all, in this vicinity we are all 
farmers, and anything that benefits the farmer benefits all of us.” 
Although the Agrol plant was located in Kansas, Christensen re-
minded Iowans that they still benefited from it. During the first 
half of 1938, the plant purchased approximately 125,000 bushels 
of corn from Iowa farmers and shipped 100,000 gallons of the fuel 
to Iowa in May 1938 alone.102 
 By early 1938, plans were in the works for a second Agrol 
distillery to be located in Sioux City, Iowa, even though the orig-
inal Atchison distillery was struggling to turn a profit. Local 
boosters encouraged Agrol to expand into Iowa. The Sioux Center 
News described “considerable demand around here for an alco-
hol blend fuel.” The Sioux City Chamber of Commerce led efforts 
to bring an Agrol distillery to the city. In a radio address, a 
speaker from the chamber told Sioux City residents that the fate 
of alcohol fuels rested on their willingness to purchase the fuel 
once it became available. “Mr. Fleet Owner, Mr. Car Owner, Mrs. 
Car Owner, will you do your part in this great movement? Have 
you the interest of America and your own welfare enough at 
heart so that you will make a real effort to help this movement 
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succeed? Have you the courage to drive from a filling station un-
serviced when told that Agrol is not on sale?” Yet plans for the 
Sioux City plant fell apart in the summer and fall of 1938 as the 
larger Agrol venture failed. Leo Christensen, who had worked 
tirelessly for alcohol fuels, both in Iowa and Kansas, returned to 
his family farm in Nebraska.103 
 
POWER ALCOHOL sputtered out in the late 1930s, a victim of 
cheap oil, coordinated attacks from the oil industry, and farm 
policies that emphasized reducing supply rather than expanding 
markets for agricultural products. Yet the end of power alcohol 
hardly marked the final debate over ethanol in Iowa. 
 Just a few years after the Agrol experiment failed, Iowa was 
again at the center of national controversy over alcohol derived 
from corn. In that case, the issue was not liquid transportation 
fuels but synthetic rubber. Immediately after the United States 
entered World War II, the nation grappled with a crippling short-
age of rubber because most natural supplies were under Japa-
nese control. Although a U.S. crash program to create synthetic 
rubber was successful, debate broke out over whether the feed-
stock for synthetic rubber should come from petroleum, which 
the oil industry preferred, or alcohol derived from agricultural 
products. Iowa Senator Guy Gillette demanded that the nation 
use corn alcohol as a synthetic rubber feedstock, opening a con-
troversial investigation in Congress. The debate pitted “farm 
rubber” against “monopoly rubber” or “Standard Oil rubber.” 
As in the 1930s power alcohol movement, though, petroleum-
based synthetic rubber proved cheaper and more immediately 
available than alternatives created from farm products.104 
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 After a hiatus during the postwar decades, Iowa’s ethanol 
debate roared back to life in the 1970s in response to concerns 
about pollution from automobiles and, most importantly, the en-
ergy crises of the decade. When the nation launched an ambi-
tious effort to cut back on smog and air pollution in the 1970s, 
Farm Belt politicians recalled the earlier power alcohol debate and 
suggested alcohol fuels as clean-burning alternatives to leaded 
gasoline. In the wake of the 1973 Arab oil embargo and the 1978–
1979 energy crisis, Iowans urged the nation to adopt ethanol-
gasoline mixtures—called gasohol in that era—as a gasoline 
supply extender and a tool for achieving energy independence. 
In the early twenty-first century, Iowa’s ethanol industry was 
boosted by the Renewable Fuel Standard (passed in 2005 and up-
dated in 2007), national legislation mandating that ethanol be 
blended into the nation’s gasoline supply. 
 What lessons can be drawn from Iowa’s original ethanol de-
bate? Iowa’s early consideration of alcohol fuels established sev-
eral important precedents that would shape the state’s—and the 
nation’s—alcohol fuels policies for the rest of the century. First, 
the 1930s power alcohol debate revealed that the high cost of 
alcohol fuels forced them into an uphill battle in their contest for 
market share with gasoline. Producing alcohol for fuel simply 
made it more expensive than gasoline in the 1930s.105 Thus, all the 
arguments in favor of alcohol fuels faced the difficult challenge 
of explaining why consumers should pay more for the new fuel. 
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During the 1930s, a few drivers in the Midwest were willing to 
do so, but it proved impossible to convince most consumers that 
it was worth paying more at the pump to support farmers. In later 
decades, namely during the 1970s oil shocks and the early 2000s, 
ethanol claimed a broader share of the fuel market at moments 
when high oil prices made alcohol fuels competitive with gasoline. 
In contrast, oil was abundant and cheap throughout the 1930s, 
and alcohol fuels never could compete with gasoline on price 
without changing the tax code. 
 Second, and closely related, the 1930s power alcohol debate 
pitted farmers’ interests against the concerns of petroleum pro-
ducers and consumers. There was little doubt that a law mandat-
ing use of alcohol fuel would provide a valuable new market for 
farm crops and perhaps raise commodity prices. But those price 
increases would be passed on to drivers in the form of higher-
priced fuel. That dynamic has persisted in ethanol debates as 
the number of drivers dwarfs the number of farmers, even in the 
1930s and more so today. Yet within the state of Iowa there was 
something closer to a balance between those interests, which 
accounts for the state’s long advocacy on behalf of alcohol fuels. 
Asking drivers to pay a bit more at the pump to help farmers 
resonated in Iowa more than elsewhere in the country. Many 
Iowans in the 1930s either lived on farms or could reach back a 
generation or two to recall their own rural roots. 
 Although the 1930s power alcohol debate established prece-
dents that have lasted for decades in the nation’s ethanol policies, 
there were important differences between the situation in the 
1930s and later debates such as the gasohol policies pursued in 
the wake of the 1970s energy crises and post-1990 ethanol policy. 
The generation of farmers and drivers who debated alcohol fuels 
in the early 1930s remembered the transition from animal to 
engine power. They were keenly aware of what had been gained 
from their new tractors and automobiles, but they also likely had 
nostalgic memories of beloved work horses. Arguments for 
power alcohol in that era were therefore tinged with agrarianism, 
in this case the demand that distant oil companies owed some-
thing to the farmers and their products for all they had displaced. 
 Additionally, debates over alternatives to oil and gas as mo-
tor fuels before the 1970s were not focused on national energy 
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independence or security, which became central to U.S. energy 
policies after the 1970s energy crises. Some of power alcohol’s 
most vocal proponents, such as Leo Christensen, certainly an-
ticipated these arguments by fretting that the nation would be 
dependent on foreign supplies in a time of war. But most Amer-
icans had little worry over energy independence in the 1930s 
when the United States was awash in cheap oil from domestic 
wells. Instead, arguments over alcohol fuels in that era were re-
gional and emphasized interstate competition. Rhetoric in favor 
of power alcohol imagined a noble heartland of struggling farm-
ers pitted against a corrupt but powerful eastern and southern 
elite of oil and gas barons. Not surprisingly, Iowa’s power alco-
hol supporters drew on a deep well of antimonopoly rhetoric in 
American culture that increasingly focused on so-called big oil 
by the middle of the twentieth century. 
 Finally, the 1930s power alcohol debate differed fundamen-
tally from later biofuels arguments in that the environmental 
benefits and costs of producing transportation fuel from farm 
crops were not central to the discussion. Beginning in the 1970s 
and continuing into the twenty-first century, arguments for and 
against ethanol have hinged on the fuel’s environmental trade-
offs. That was not the case during the 1930s. In part, the lack of 
environmental focus during the 1930s reflected that era’s think-
ing about the natural world. Modern environmentalism and con- 
cerns about environmental harm from gasoline-powered auto-
mobiles did not become widespread until the postwar era.106 
To be sure, some power alcohol proponents anticipated later en-
vironmental critiques of the oil and gas regime. Leo Christensen 
described oil as a finite natural reserve in contrast to alcohol fuels, 
which he framed as a renewable national income. Other farm 
chemurgists went further in anticipating environmental argu-
ments. For instance, William Hale argued that gasoline-powered 
automobiles were already leading to smog and carbon monoxide 
problems in major cities such as London and New York.107 Yet 
that issue never became a focus of the 1930s power alcohol debate, 
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although it was perhaps a missed opportunity for power alcohol 
proponents because one of their strongest arguments was that 
alcohol could replace tetraethyl lead as an octane booster, known 
even then to be poisonous. 
 Iowa’s first serious debate about the merits of using alcohol 
derived from corn as transportation fuel occurred in the 1930s. In 
the short term, the power alcohol movement of the 1930s was a 
failure. Bills mandating that 10 percent of the state’s motor fuel 
supply come from alcohol failed in the General Assembly, and 
the Agrol experiment was bankrupt by the end of the decade. But 
the state’s debate over alcohol as a motor fuel was just beginning. 
Well into the next century, Iowans are still debating the intersec-
tion of corn and politics. 
